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HARRY KALVEN, JR.

'THE NEW YORK TIMES CASE: A
NOTE ON "THE CENTRAL MEANING
OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT"

I. Tm~m
On occasion the Supreme Court hands down a decision in
which past doctrine intersects present events in so complex a way

as to be the despair of the commentator, not only because its portent is almost beyond prediction, but also because it opens so many

avenues for inquiry. Just such a decision was New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan' in which the Court unanimously 2 held that a libel judgment rendered under Alabama law was violative of First Amendment principles and, therefore, of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Since the case involved a rare instance of measuring the common
law of defamation by constitutional standards, 3 it clamors for a
Harry Kalven is Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.

1376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2 There were, however, three opinions. Mr. Justice Brennan wrote the opinion
for the Court. Justices Black and Goldberg each wrote a concurring opinion in
which Mr. Justice Douglas joined.
3 The question has arisen before primarily in connection with the absolute
privilege of high-ranking government executives. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564
(1959); Spaulding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896); see also Schenectady Union Pub.
Co. v. Sweeney, 316 U.S. 642 (1942), where the Court was evenly divided on a
question of libel to a public official. Cf. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952)
191
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careful determination of how much of that traditional body of tort
law is affected by it. And for the torts teacher, it has the dizzying
consequence of transmuting a part of his domain-one that he traditionally does not reach until the last day of the semester-into constitutional law,4 the Valhalla of the law school curriculum. Moreover, even a cursory examination of the case reveals that the decision was responsive to the pressures of the day created by the
Negro protest movement and thus raises the question so frequently
mooted whether the Supreme Court has adhered to neutral principles in reaching its conclusion. 5 And, in this instance, the issue is
made particularly attractive by the fact that Herbert Wechsler
was counsel to the Times, and brilliantly persuasive counsel at that.,
It is tempting to ask whether Wechsler the advocate secured a
result that Wechsler the critic would condone.7 Again, the case is
a major instance of the important consequences of the civil rights
issue and the apparatus of protest that accompanies it. The Negro
movement is making significant constitutional law not only in
the area of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause
but in unexpected sectors of First Amendment theory.8 Whatever
(group libel and criminal sanctions); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)
(defamation of public officials and injunctive remedy).
4The question of the constitutionality of the law of defamation has occasioned
comparatively little commentary. See Kalven, The Law of Defamation and the First
Amendment, in THE UNvaasiry oF CHcAGo LAw ScHOOL, CONERENcE ON THE ARTS,
PUBLISHING, AND Tm LAW 3 (1952); Cahn, Justice Black and First Amendment
"Absolutes": A Public interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. RFv. 549 (1962).

5 The basic article is Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw,
73 HARV.L. REv. 1 (1959).
6Professor Wechsler was not alone on the brief. Herbert Brownell, Thomas F.
Daly, and seven other distinguished lawyers and law firms were also of counsel.
A careful comparison of the brief and the opinion of the Court would itself be
a profitable enterprise. At various critical points, the opinion echoes the carefully
precise language of the brief and the structure of the Cour's argument reflects
the structure of argument in the brief.
7 However tempting it would be to approach the case in this manner, I think it
clear that the opinion satisfies the demand for "neutral principles."
8 1 attempted to develop this theme in a series of lectures at the Ohio State Law
School in February 1964. These lectures are scheduled to appear early in 1965 as a
book entitled The Negro and the FirstAmendment.
It is worth noting that Mr. Justice Douglas, in a prescient dissent in Beauharnais,
note 3 supra, observed: "Today a white man stands convicted for protesting in
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the irritations and crises of "the long hot summer," the protest has
maintained the dignity of political action, of an elaborate petition
for redress of grievances. And no one has been more sensitive to
this sociological reality than the Supreme Court itself.
Beyond these points, the case raises sharply the question of the
relevance of history for constitutional interpretation. In the course
of the opinions, the Justices directly confronted the question of the
constitutional status of the Sedition Act of 1798. The opinions bypassed what historians like W. W. Crosskey and Leonard Levy have
said on the subject9 in order to reach the conclusion that, whatever
history might suggest, the Sedition Act is now unconstitutional.
It is unconstitutional because the reaction after the passage of the
Sedition Act precipitated a national consensus to that effect. "[T]he
attack upon its validity has," Mr. Justice Brennan stated, "carried
the day in the court of history." 10 This is heady doctrine. The Court
has never before been quite so candid about its use of history. A
major issue in constitutional doctrine thus beckons.
This article will not, however, be concerned with the attractions
of these four siren songs. Instead it will pursue the significance of
the case in yet another dimension, that of First Amendment theory
and doctrine. In brief compass, my thesis is that the Court, compelled by the political realities of the case to decide it in favor of
the Times, yet equally compelled to seek high ground in justifying
unseemly language against our decisions invalidating restrictive covenants. Tomorrow a Negro will be haled before a court for denouncing lynch law in heated terms."
343 US. at 286.
0 See CROSSirY, PoraTics Am =h CONSTITUTioN 767 (1953); Lavy, THE LEGACY oF
StnPnssioN (1960). The very purpose of Dean Levy's book was to ascertain whether
the First Amendment was aimed at the abolition of seditious libel. He concluded:
"If, however, a choice must be made between two propositions, first, that the
clause substantially embodied the Blackstonian definition and left the law of seditious
libel in force, or second, that it repudiated Blackstone and superseded the common
law, the known evidence points strongly in favor of the former proposition. Contrary to Justice Holmes, history favors the notion:' Op. cit. supra, at 247-48.
The Court did not ignore the Levy book but cited it, correctly, for the view
that the meaning of the First Amendment emerged only after the uproar created
by the passage of the Sedition Act. Id. at ch. 6. Dean Levy himself did not find the
history of the Amendment binding, because the Constitution, at least in the area of
civil liberties, "need not be anchored in the past.' Id. at 4. For a critical review of
the Levy thesis, see Anastplo, Book Reviews, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 735 (1964).
10 376 U.S. at 276.
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its result, wrote an opinion that may prove to be the best and most
important it has ever produced in the realm of freedom of speech.
I would make it clear, however, that I am not so much predicting
what the Court will do with the case as a precedent as I am suggesting that the opinion makes a notable shift in constitutional idiom
and could provide a new start for consideration of free-speech
problems. Implicit in this approach is a distinction between the
history of legal ideas and precedent, at least at the constitutional
level. Certainly the Court's ideas about freedom of speech have
commanded as much attention and interest as its rulings.
II. Tim FAcTs: A FIRST VIEw

I propose to view the facts first in brief compass and then
elaborate on them in light of the political demands. The libel action
was brought by Sullivan, the police commissioner of Montgomery,
Alabama, against four Alabama clergymen, including Reverend
Fred L. Shuttlesworth, and the New York Times. The allegedly
defamatory publication was a full-page advertisement soliciting
contributions for "The Committee To Defend Martin Luther King
and the Struggle for Freedom in the South." It consisted largely of
editorial comment about the mistreatment by the police and the
community of Dr. King and Negro students active in protesting
the deprivation of civil rights." It spoke eloquently of the growing
momentum of the protest movement. Its tide: "Heed Their Rising
Voices," was taken from a New York Times editorial.
The Times was sued as the publisher of the advertisement 2 and
the four clergymen were sued as sponsors and publishers 3 whose
names had appeared prominently in the advertisement along with
11The third and sixth paragraphs of the advertisement that form the basis for
the suit are set out in the text at note 30, infra.

12 The Court found no significance in the fact that the alleged defamation was
contained in a paid advertisement. It sharply distinguished Valentine v. Chrestensen,
316 U.S. 52 (1942), where a commercial advertisement was found unprotected by
the First Amendment. "The publication here was not a 'commercial' advertisement
in the sense in which the word was used in Chrestensen." 376 U.S. at 266.
13 The Court never reached the question whether these defendants were sufficiently connected with the publication to be treated as publishers. Each of the
individual defendants claimed that he had not authorized the advertisement and, in
fact, had not seen it prior to the request for a retraction.
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those of some eighty others, none of whom seem to have been
amenable to suit in Alabama. The case was tried to a jury which
brought in a verdict for $500,000 in favor of the plaintiff. A judgment on the verdict was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Alabama.

14

The Alabama law of defamation appears to have been the same
as that of the vast majority of American jurisdictions. It left to the
jury the question whether the text of the ad, which did not identify
the plaintiff by name or office, referred to the plaintiff."5 No specific damages were shown by the plaintiff, but, as is customary
under Anglo-American libel law, he was held entitled to a presumption of general damages' and the Alabama Supreme Court declined
to find the damages excessive.. 7 The rule of fair comment in Alabama, like that in the majority of jurisdictions in this country, limits
the privilege to the expression of defamatory opinions based on
facts that are established as true. 8 In the instant case, the defendants
were unable to establish the truth of several of the particulars alleged. The trial court, therefore, withdrew from the jury the question whether the text was defamatory; it held it libelous as a matter
of law. 19 Since the text charged brutality and harassment in the
14 273 Ala. 656 (1963). The Alabama court disposed of the constitutional issues
in a single paragraph of a lengthy opinion.
15 See, e.g., GREGORY & KALVEN,
(hereafter GREGoRy & KALVEN).
16aId. at 910-26, 930-38.

CASES ANlD MATERIALS IN ToRTS 968-73 (1959)

17 Id. at 926 et seq.; Note, 35 A.L.R. 2d 218-63 (1954).
18 GRGORY & KALvEN 1042-58. The basic article on the subject is Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates,49 CoLum. L. REv. 875 (1949); see also Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game and Fair Comment, 42 COLUm. L.
REV. 1085, 1282 (1942); Veeder, Freedom of Public Discussion, 23 HIARv. L. REv.
413 (1910).
It is arguable that the fair-comment concept has been awkwardly put in the
common-law decisions and that what is really involved is the degree to which the
underlying facts are disclosed when the opinion is expressed and the inference
drawn. Cf., e.g., Eickhoff v. Gilbert, 124 Mich. 353 (1900); Kellems v. California
C..O., 68 F. Supp 277 (ND. Calif. 1946); Veeder, supra,at 419-20.

19 The Alabama court spoke of "libel per se" in this connection, apparently meaning no more than the matter was libelous as a matter of law. The phrase has otherwise had a complex and checkered history. See GREGoRy & KALvEN 974-81.
In view of the political importance of the Times case, there is historical irony
in the fact that the court took the question of defamation away from the jury. The
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execution of police duties, this step also seems unexceptionable under general tort law. Again, the trial court followed the general
rule that there is strict liability in defamation and that no actual
malice need be proved. 0 It followed that the misstatement of facts
could not be defended on the ground that they were not known to
the defendants to be untrue.
The jury was also instructed that it could find punitive damages;
that punitive damages need not have any relation to compensatory
damages; but that punitive damages required a showing of actual
malice. These are all familiar points of the law of defamation. 2 '
The $500,000 verdict was not separated by the jury into compensatory and punitive portions. Under Alabama law, punitive damages
could not be claimed unless a retraction had been requested and
refused. 2 The plaintiff did request a retraction and the Times did
refuse to tender it. In the facts showing the failure to offer a retraction, the Court saw a basis for a finding of malice. Finally, the
Alabama court found that the Times was sufficiently engaged in
business within the state to subject it to personal jurisdiction and
that, in any event, it had, by a general appearance, waived any
objection to jurisdiction over its person.
The first point established by the facts is that Alabama did not
create any special rules of law for these defendants. It simply
applied the existing principles of the law of libel. On the surface,
the case does not seem essentially different from such standard
precedents as Youssoupof v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures,
Ltd.,2a Jones v. E. Hulton & Co. 24 Peck v. Tribune Co.,2" or Marr
v. Putnam.26 It has long been noted that the law of defamation, with
its three "galloping presumptions" of damage, falsity, and malice,
great fight over seditious libel in England which culminated in 1792 in the passage
of Fox's Libel Act was concerned with right of the jury to define the standard of
libel.
20

GmoRy & KALVFN 982-96.

21

Id. at 926-30.

22

See Morris, Inadvertent Newspaper Libel and Retraction, 32 ILi. L. Rxv. 36
(1934).
23 50 T.L.R. 581 (CA. 1934).
24 [1909] 2 K.B. 444, aff'd, [1910] A.C. 20.
25 214 U.S. 185 (1909).

26 196 Ore. 1 (1952).

HeinOnline -- 1964 Sup. Ct. Rev. 196 1964

THE NEW YORK TIMES CASE

197

can produce strangely artificial results. 27 It is important to stress that
the Alabama decision was not simply a sham.
III. Tm FAcrs: A SECOND Vmw
The case cannot, of course, be cut off so completely from
the turbulent reality that produced it as the statement of facts set
out above would do. Certain additional facts must be deemed relevant to the disposition of the issues.
First, the connection of the Times with Alabama could scarcely
be more marginal: of the 650,000 published copies of the issues containing the advertisement, only 394 were distributed in Alabama,
of which 35 were circulated in Montgomery County. 28 The publication, addressed primarily to a national audience, was all but
invisible in the community in which plaintiff was claiming harm
to his reputation.
The defamatory import presented an inverse instance of what has
become known in the law of defamation as the "wrong-thinking
minority problem." 20 The problem usually arises when an assertion
about the plaintiff would not be considered defamatory by rightthinking people, e.g., that the plaintiff has Jewish or Negro blood.
The rule has been that the court will run the risk of ratifying the
prejudice rather than pass on the issue whether the statement ought
to have damaged the plaintiff. The plaintiff is entitled to have his
reputation protected even among people who do not have "proper"
values. The irony in the Times case is that the statements of police
brutality and harassment would offend those with the "right" values. What is doubtful is that such allegations did, in fact, offend an
Alabama audience, in light of the current exacerbations of the civil
rights controversy.
This quirk to one side, there was the difficulty of connecting the
statements made by the defendant with the plaintiff, an issue that
loomed large in the Supreme Court's handling of the case. Quota2

7 Courtney, Absurdities of the Law of Libel and Slander, 36 Am. L. REv. 552
(1902); DEAN, HATmD, RICULE oR CoNrEwT (1954).
28 376 U.S. at 260 n.3.
20 The leading case is Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185 (1909). See also Riesman,
supra note 18, at 1300 et seq.; Note, Developments in the Law: Defamation, 69
HAv. L. REv. 875, 886-87 (1956); GEGoRy & KALvEN 961-64.
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tion of the two offending paragraphs in the advertisement can spotlight this difficulty:3 °
In Montgomery, Alabama, after students sang "My Country, 'Tis of Thee" on the State Capitol steps, their leaders were
expelled from the school, and trucdoads of police armed with
shotguns and tear-gas ringed the Alabama State College Campus. When the entire student body protested to state authorities by refusing to re-register, their dining hall was padlocked
in an attempt to starve them into submission.
Again and again the Southern violators have answered Dr.
King's peaceful protests with intimidation and violence. They
have bombed his home almost killing his wife and child. They
have assaulted his person. They have arrested him seven timesfor "speeding," "loitering" and similar "offenses." And now
they have charged him with "perjury"-a felony under which
they could imprison him for ten years....
The plaintiff argued that as head of the police and responsible for
their activities, he was, by inference, charged with: (1) ringing the
campus with armed police; (2) arresting Dr. King for spurious
offenses. This step, if not compelling, is at least not utterly artificial.
Plaintiff claimed further, however, that because these two items
referred to him, he would also be understood as one of the persons
responsible for: (3) padlocking the dining room and starving the
students; (4) bombing the King home; (5) assaulting King; and
(6) charging him with perjury. It would seem more reasonable to
assume that the "they" referred to in the second quoted paragraph
was intended to suggest no specific persons but rather the "Establishment" in which the plaintiff's role would be only incidental.
Indeed, both paragraphs would seem to be concerned with such an
amorphous group rather than individuals such as the plaintiff.
On a second reading then, there are statements invisibly published in plaintiff's community, which refer to him only by a
strained construction of their language, and which, given the mood
of the day, would not likely be considered defamatory by a southern audience. It is this marginal harm that the jury added up to
$500,000 damages. One further element needs to be added to give
the whole picture.
30 376 U.S. at 257-58. (Emphasis in original.)
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The gossamer thread on which defendant's liability depended
was made thinner by the fact that in order to show that the statements of fact were untrue, plaintiff had to reverse the logic by
which he showed that the statements referred to him. On this aspect
of the case, he argued that the arrests of Dr. King, for example,
occurred before his tenure as commissioner and that as commissioner
he had nothing to do with the perjury indictment. Therefore, he
asserted, the statements were false as to him. There is revealed here
a new technique by which defamation might be endlessly manufactured. First, it is argued that, contrary to all appearances, a statement referred to the plaintiff; then, that it falsely ascribed to the
plaintiff something that he did not do, which should be rather easy
to prove about a statement that did not refer to plaintiff in the first
place. As it turned out, the Court did not have to confront this
logic, which remains temporarily buried for resurrection at some
later time.
The plaintiff did, however, have more traditional allegations of
falsity of the statements. And here their relevance to the opinion is
of significance. In several nagging particulars, the statements are not
absolutely accurate; they reveal an inaccuracy characteristic of hastily drawn newspaper advertisements of this nature. The roster of
inaccuracies is something like this: (1) The dining hall was never
padlocked. (2) The students did not refuse to reregister. (3) Less
than the entire student body protested. (4) The student leaders
were not expelled for the protest on the capitol steps. (5) The
police at no time literally ringed the campus. (6) Although the
police did appear near the campus on three occasions, it was never
in connection with the protest at the capitol. (7) Dr. King had not
been arrested seven times. (8) The charge that Dr. King was
assaulted was flimsy and was based on a single controverted instance
of some years before. Nonetheless, almost every allegation had a
core of truth. Dr. King had been arrested four times. Police had
been deployed near the campus in large numbers. Student leaders
had been expelled for taking part in sit-in demonstrations. Most of
the student body had protested. The protest had taken the form of
boycotting classes.
It is tempting to say that the falsity reduces itself to a charge that
Dr. King was arrested seven times rather than four. And that the
students sang "My Country 'Tis of Thee," when in fact they sang
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the national anthem. But the other points are not so trivial. And it
would prove a disturbing exercise to see what would be left of the
first quoted paragraph if all the facts were stated with absolute precision. Since it is characteristic of the common law of defamation to
measure the defense of truth against very stringent standards, the
conclusion that the falsity of the statements was harmless would not
comport with established legal tests.8 '
Perhaps an additional fact has to be taken into consideration.
That is that other Montgomery County officials and the Governor
of Alabama had also decided that the advertisement defamed them
and four additional libel suits were pending seeking judgments
against the Times for an additional 2.5 million dollars.
On the second reading of the facts, the inescapable impression is
that, although the Alabama law had not been distorted to achieve
the result, Alabama somehow pounced on this opportunity to
punish the Times for its role in supporting the civil rights movement in the South. The judgment, along with the others that were
bound to follow, represented a powerful blow in the South's counterattack. In the civil war that is being waged in the courts as well
as elsewhere, the political importance of the case could not be
ignored.
One problem among the many that the Court faces in cases of
this kind is attributable to the fact that it cannot, like the man in the
street, simply state the result that it likes. There may be compelling
reasons for decision that it cannot offer publicly without jeopardizing its role and image as a court. The "hard" cases of constitutional
law demand high judicial statesmanship. In the Times case, the
Court was prepared to pay the high price of destroying a considerable part of the common law of defamation. Whether the price was
too high must be determined by the adequacy of the contribution it
has made to First Amendment doctrine.
8

1 See, e.g., Kilian v. Doubleday & Co., 367 Pa. 117 (1951); Sharpe v. Stevenson,

34 N.C. 239 (1851). The headnote in the Sharpe case reads: "In an action of slander

(under our statute) for charging that the plaintiff had criminal intercourse with
one A, at a particular time and place, the defendant cannot justify by showing that
she had such intercourse with A, at another time and place." The common law
would seem to have been changed in England by the Defamation Act of 1952, 5 5.
15 & 16 Geo. VI & 1 Eliz. II, c. 66.
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IV. THE OPINIoN: A FIRST READING
There are two readings that may be given the Court's opinion by Mr. Justice Brennan which are, perhaps, only subtly different. But in that small margin of difference is to be found the possibility of a major shift in First Amendment theory.
I start with the narrower reading. The Court began by rejecting
the view of the Alabama Supreme Court that libel is beneath constitutional protection. This position was lent credence by dicta in
cases like Chaplinsky3 2 Near,8 3 Pennekamp 4 and, especially, Beaubarnais35 and Roth, 3 6 none of which was directly concerned with
libel. The theme was that the mere labels of state law could not
effectively foreclose constitutional scrutiny by the Supreme Court.
A year or two ago, the Court had used this thesis brilliantly in penetrating the attempt by the State of Virginia to impose sanctions on
the NAACP because it improperly engaged in solicitation of legal
business.37 Following this line, the Court at the outset refused to
permit the door to be slammed against its scrutiny of the judgment
on the simple ground that Alabama had called this libel. This sector
of the Court's argument concluded with a sentence that echoes the
high literacy of the Wechsler brief: 3 "... . libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment."
Several issues are intertwined here. At the simplest level, it is, of
course, correct that the Court cannot permit the concepts of state
law to control constitutional scrutiny. If the constitutional principle, for example, is that the state may regulate X, the principle can
become illusory if the state is left free to define X as it will. What is
muted in the opinion are two propositions of a less general and less
abstract nature. First there is the fact that Alabama was not creating
doctrine for this case in order to call it libel. Second is the existence
32

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).

33

Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).

3

4 Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 US. 331 (1946).

35

Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
30 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).

N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
38 376 U.S. at 269.
37
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of the two-level theory of the First Amendment used by the Court
in Beauharnaisto justify regulation of group libel and in Roth to
justify regulation of obscenity .

9

This screen pushed aside, the Court proceeded to its main argument. "The general proposition [is] that freedom of expression
upon public questions is secured by the First Amendment. ' 40 There
followed a brief exposition of the "general proposition" supported,
among other authorities, by the Brandeis opinion in Whitney.41 It
was felicitously summed up in these words: 42 "Thus we consider
this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open." The Court thus appeared to command a strong major premise about freedom of discussion of public
issues. In a quick stroke, the Court then asserted that the advertisement in the case was "an expression of grievance and protest on one
of the major public issues of our time." 43 It would seem, therefore
"clearly to qualify for the constitutional protection." 4
The Court then turned to the major task of its lengthy opinion,
an exploration of the bases for impeaching the prima facie case
made in defense of the advertisement. "The question," said Mr.
Justice Brennan of the advertisement, "is whether it forfeits that
protection by the falsity of some of its factual statements and by its
alleged defamation of respondent." 45 The answer to this pivotal
question is presented in three instalments. First, the Court rejected
"any test of truth" as a First Amendment requirement; "factual
error affords no warrant for repressing speech that would otherwise
be free." 46 Second, the Court rejected injury to official reputation
as grounds for "repressing speech that would otherwise be free.1 47
And, finally, the Court rejected the conjunction of factual error
and injury to official reputation as providing any more adequate
basis for overcoming the prima facie case. "This is the lesson to be
39 The effect of the Times case on this line of analysis is considered in the text
at notes 111 et seq. infra.
40 376 U.S. at 269.

41 Wbitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927).
42 376 U.S. at 270.
45 Ibid.
43 Id. at 271.

46Id. at 272.

44 Ibid.

47 Id.
at 272-73.
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drawn from the great controversy over the Sedition Act of
1798....
It is at this point that the opinion departed from the impressive
clarity and structure with which it had begun. Having disposed of
the grounds for impeaching the prima facie case for constitutional
protection of the advertisement, the Court could be expected to
conclude immediately that the advertisement was entitled to that
protection. Instead, however, the opinion moved on to new grounds
concerned with the "inhibiting" effect of damage awards. 49 Apparently it took this position to meet an argument never explicitly
made that no restriction on free speech existed in this factual situation because only tort damages and not criminal sanctions are involved. The Court made short shrift of this feeble point: 50 "The
judgment awarded in this case-without the need for any proof of
actual pecuniary loss-was one thousand times greater than the
maximum fine provided by the Alabama criminal statute, and one
hundred times greater than that provided by the Sedition Act."
Then the Court returned to an issue that had already been
treated: "[T]he state rule of law is not saved by its allowance of the
defense of truth."5 1 It is difficult to appreciate why that matter had
not already been disposed of when the Court so eloquently stated
that there is no test of truth in these matters. Originally the point
was made that falsity could not be penalized because it was a necessary concomitant of""robust" discussion of public issues. The second time around, the point made was that allowance of truth as a
defense could not represent a sufficient policy for protecting freedom of speech because it will impose a kind of "self-censorship" on
speakers in the public forum.
In any event, once more the Court had reached the place for ending its opinion. In fact, however, the Court had then just started on
its specific grounds for decision. What it required was a rule that
would permit good faith error in public discussion. The constitutional rule for fair comment about public officials requires that the
plaintiff demonstrate that the falsity was uttered with actual
malice. This was, as the Court noted, the minority rule among the
American jurisdictions. And its conclusion was buttressed somehow
48

Id.at 273.

49 Id. at 277.

so Ibid.
6 lId. at 278.
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by analogy to Barr v. Matteo,52 in which the Court had recently
stated the government official privilege in the same terms. It would
be anomalous, the Court proposed, if the citizen in his official role as
critic were to be treated differently from other officials.
The Court then assured that its newly stated rule would not
authorize another verdict in the same case on retrial by itself assessing the evidence and determining that it was not adequate to submit
the case to the jury. The Court has hitherto rarely displayed such a
taste for common sense in deciding a question not directly before it.
And then to make assurance doubly sure, it ruled that the evidence
was inadequate to connect the plaintiff with the assertions made in
the advertisement. This is a powerful point 53 and causes wonder
why the Court did not choose to rest on this issue alone, avoiding
the embarrassment of upsetting the rule adopted by a majority of
the states on the question of fair comment. Conversely, it is equally
puzzling why the Court, having found a fatal defect by reason of
the fair comment rule applied, felt compelled to add this second
basis for disposition. It is this conundrum that brings me to the
second reading of the opinion, the one that contains the seed of
important new doctrine.
V. TH OPINION: A SEcoND READING
The exciting possibilities in the Court's opinion derive from
its emphasis on seditious libel and the Sedition Act of 1798 as the
key to the meaning of the First Amendment. My thesis is dependent
on four propositions. First, that the importance of the free-speech
provision of the Constitution rests on the rejection of seditious libel
as an offense. Second, that constitutional history and the traditional
analysis had relegated the concept of seditious libel to a curiously
unimportant place, although the nagging question of the constitutionality of the Sedition Act of 1798 had never properly been put
to rest. Third, that the special virtue of the Times opinion is its
restoration of seditious libel to its essential role, thus suddenly and
dramatically changing the idiom of free-speech analysis and resolving the question of the constitutionality of the Sedition Act. Finally, that the effect of the Times opinion is necessarily to discard or
'52 360 U.S. 564 (1959).

53 Cf. Rossman, J., dissenting, in Marr v. Putnam, 196 Ore. 1, 40 (1952).
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diminish in importance the clear-and-present danger test, the balancing formula, the two-level speech theory of Beauharnais and
Roth, and the two-tier theory of different effects of the First
Amendment on federal and state action. If I am right, the Times
case represents a happy revolution of free-speech doctrine. Or, to
put the matter differently, analysis of free-speech issues should
hereafter begin with the significant issue of seditious libel and
defamation of government by its critics rather than with the sterile
example of a man falsely yelling fire in a crowded theater.
My first proposition need not detain us long. The concept of
seditious libel strikes at the very heart of democracy.54 Political
freedom ends when government can use its powers and its courts to
silence its critics. My point is not the tepid one that there should be
leeway for criticism of the government. It is rather that defamation
of the government is an impossible notion for a democracy. In
brief, I suggest, that the presence or absence in the law of the concept of seditious libel defines the society. A society may or may not
treat obscenity or contempt by publication as legal offenses without
altering its basic nature. If, however, it makes seditious libel an
offense, it is not a free society no matter what its other characteristics.
My second proposition, the denigration of the importance of
seditious libel in establishing First Amendment principles, is more
difficult to establish. Perhaps it is only the accident of the sequence
in which the speech cases have come to the Court,55 combined with
the fact that the Court never had the sedition laws before it, that
leaves the impression of its disregard of seditious libel and its fascination with the clear-and-present danger formula and balancing.
Perhaps it is because we have not used functional categories in
working out the theory of free speech. In any event, we do not
54 See generally on the subject of seditious libel, CnArFE, FREE SPEECH ix THE
Ummrra STATES 19 et seq., 497-516 (1948); 2 STEPHEN, HiSToRy oF THE CRiMiNAL
LAW 299, 353 (1883); LEVY, op. cit. supra note 9, at 1-17; Cahn, note 4 supra; Cahn,

Defamation Control v. Press Freedom:A Current Chapterin Israel,13 J. PuB. LAw 3
(1964).

55 Although Near v. Minnesota, note 33 supra, presented the same problem of
seditious libel, the Court, able to dispose of the case on grounds of prior restraint,
had no need to confront the more essential issue.
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start with the notion that seditious libel is clearly beyond the power
of government and develop our ideas from that proposition. 6
Certainly, the logic of the clear-and-present danger test does not
foreclose the matter. It leaves the status of seditious libel in doubt.
It does not suggest that severe criticism of government policy couldr
never be sufficiently dangerous. Indeed, one might cite Schenck,
Debs, 8 and Abrams as three cases in which the Court itself
reached the opposite conclusion.
Moreover, until its disposition by the Times case, the status of the
Sedition Act of 1798 remained an open question. It has been a term
of infamy in American usage, but sober judgments about its constitutionality have been few indeed. Many distinguished commentators-Corwin, 0 Hall, 61 and Carroll, 62 for example-regarded
the Sedition Act as constitutional, and Story might also be numbered among them.63 Even Chafee, who makes a strong case for the
unconstitutionality of the Act in the opening chapter of his classic,
seems willing to leave the question unresolved.64 More recent re56

For example, Professor Emerson, in his careful and thorough inventory of
legal analyses of free speech issues, does not give a prominent part to seditious libel.
See Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the FirstAmendment, 72 YArz L. J. 877
(1963).
5

7Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).

58 Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
59

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
Corwin, Freedom of Speech and Press under the FirstAmendment: A Resume,
30 YAI E L. J. 48 (1920).
6
1 Hall, Free Speech in War Time, 21 CoLum. L. Rav. 526 (1921).
60

62

Carroll, Freedom of Speech and of the Press in the Federalist Period: The
Sedition Act, 18 MicH. L. Rav. 615 (1920).
63
SToRY, 3 CoMIVMNTARIES ON m CONSTrUTION OF THE UNED STATES 743-44
(1833).
64 CHAZi, op. cit. supra note 54, at 28. It is difficult to assess Chafee's position
on this point properly. He has deservedly been considered the most ififluential
American writer on free-speech issues and is an important contributor to "the broad
consensus" the Court relies on to find that the Sedition Act is unconstitutional.
376 U.S. at 276. And it would seem that Dean Levy regards Chafee as the principal
opponent of his thesis that the Framers of the Constitution probably intended to
leave the English law of seditious libel unaffected. See LEVY, op. cit. supra note 9,
at 2 et seq. My point is not that Chafee was insensitive to the tension between
seditious libel and democracy, but rather that in his desire to make Holmes the chief
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demonstrated how awkward

a problem the Sedition Act presents. My point, for the moment, is
not to choose the better view of the history of the First Amendment and the Sedition Act, but rather to call attention to the fact
that for over 150 years it was not thought necessary to establish the

status of the Act as a first step in getting to the meaning of the First
Amendment. It was thus possible for the Espionage Act of 1917, as

amended in 1918, to contain sections that oddly echoed the idiom
of seditious libel:6 6 "language intended to bring the form of government of the United States ... or the Constitution... or the flag...
or the uniform of the Army or Navy into contempt, scorn, con-

tumely, or disrepute." And it was possible for the Government
solemnly to urge that the Sedition Act was constitutional in its
argument in the Abrarns case in 1919.67
Then there was the performance of the Court in 1952 in Beau-

harnaisv. Illinois,"'where the majority, in an opinion by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, upheld the constitutionality of a group-libel statute.
One might have expected that, in dealing with a question of the
application of defamation to comments about a public issue-the
alleged activities of Negroes moving into white neighborhoods, the
principal task of the Court would be to distinguish group libel from

seditious libel. Yet the majority opinion is virtually silent on the
9
point.
I turn, then, to the third proposition concerned with the meaning
architect of American theory he was led to emphasize clear and present danger
as the chief analytical tool and to contrast it, not to seditious libel, but to what
he called the "bad tendency test."
05 Op. cit. supra note 9.
66 40 Star. 553 (1918); see CrAFE, op. cit. supra note 54, at 40-41.
607 t was in response to this argument that Holmes, in dissent, made his prestigious

and cavalier dismissal of the Sedition Act: "I wholly disagree with the argument
of the Government that the First Amendment left the common law as to seditious
libel in" force. History seems to me against the notion. I had conceived that the
United States through many years has shown its repentance for the Sedition Act
of 1798, by repaying the fines that it imposed." 250 U.S. at 630.
08 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
6
9 Mr. Justice Frankfurter did add a faint cautionary note that libels on political
parties would raise "quite different problems" from those before the Court in
Beaubarnais.Id. at 263 n.18.
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of the Court's opinion in the Times case. I suggest that the critical
statement in Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion is: 70 "If neither factual
error nor defamatory content suffices to remove the constitutional
shield from criticism of official conduct, the combination of the
two elements is no less inadequate. This is the lesson to be drawn
from the great controversy over the Sedition Act of 1798, 1 Stat.
586, which first crystallized a national awareness of the central
meaning of the First Amendment. See Levy, Legacy of Suppression
(1960), at 258 et seq.... ." There follows an extended discussion of
the "great controversy," with appropriate quotations from Madison
whose views the Court summarizes thus: 71 "The right of free public
discussion of the stewardship of public officials was thus, in Madison's view, a fundamental principle of the American form of government."
The Court then, for the first time in its history and some 166
years after the enactment of the Sedition Act, turned squarely to
the issue of its constitutionality. The answer was that "the attack
upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history. '72 The
opinion cited Jefferson, Calhoun, Holmes, Brandeis, Jackson,
Douglas, Cooley, and Chafee and concluded:73 "These views reflect
a broad concensus that the Act, because of the restraint it imposed
upon criticism of government and public officials, was inconsistent
with the First Amendment."
The Court did not simply, in the face of an awkward history,
definitively put to rest the status of the Sedition Act. More important, itfound in the controversy over seditious libel the clue to "the
central meaning of the First Amendment." The choice of language
was unusually apt. The Amendment has a "central meaning"-a
core of protection of speech without which democracy cannot
function, without which, -in Madison's phrase, "the censorial
power" would be in the Government over the people and not "in
the people over the Government." This is not the whole meaning
of the Amendment. There are other freedoms protected by it. But
at the center there is no doubt what speech is being protected and
no doubt why it is being protected. The theory of the freedom of
speech clause was put right side up for the first time.
70376

U.S. at 273. Cf. Brief for the Petitioner, The New York Times, 45-46.
72 Id. at 276.
73 Ibid.

71376 U.S. at 275.
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Although the total structure of the opinion is not without its
difficulties, it seems to me to convey, however imperfectly, the following crucial syllogism: The central meaning of the Amendment
is that seditious libel cannot be made the subject of government
sanction. The Alabama rule on fair comment is closely akin to making seditious libel an offense. The Alabama rule therefore violated
the central meaning of the Amendment.
If the opinion can be read in this way, what emerges as of large
importance is the generous sweep of the major premise and not the
application of it to the point of defamation law involved in the
Times case. The touchstone of the First Amendment has become
the abolition of seditious libel and what that implies about the function of free speech on public issues in American democracy. The
drama of the Times case then is that the Court, forced to extricate
itself from the political impasse that was presented to it, did so by
returning to the essence of the First Amendment to be found in its
limitations on seditious libel. It gets to very high ground indeed.
There are two other portions of the opinion, already noted, that
confirm the proposition that the Court is carried along by a momentum of insight about the democratic necessities for free speech.
There is the analogy to Barr v. Matteo74 and the privilege of the
high-ranking government executive. The rationale in Barrwas that
the threat of damage suits would dampen the ardor of the official
for the performance of his duties. "Analogous considerations support the privilege for the citizen-critic of government. It is as much
his duty to criticize as it is the official's duty to administer."'7 5 It is
now not only the citizen's privilege to criticize his government, it is
his duty. At this point in its rhetoric and sweep, the opinion almost
literally incorporated Alexander Meiklejohn's thesis that in a
democracy the citizen as ruler is our most important public offi76

cial.

Then there is the alternative ground for judgment concerned
with the inadequate linking of the plaintiff to the language of the
advertisement. If such connection is too easily made, all criticism
of government policy, however impersonal, will carry implicit
74 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
76

75 376 U.S. at 282.

MEILEJOHN, POLrriCAL FREEDOm: THE CoNsrrIuTroNAL PowERs OF TuE PEOPLE

34-36 (1948).
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defamation of whatever officials were in charge of the policy attacked. Such a rule of construction, said Mr. Justice Brennan,
"would sidestep this [constitutional] obstacle by transmuting criticism of government, however impersonal it may seem on its face,
into personal criticism, and hence potential libel, of the officials of
whom the government is composed. There is no legal alchemy by
which a State may thus create the cause of action that would otherAnd then, to underscore the centrality of
wise be denied ....
seditious libel for the First Amendment, Mr. Justice Brennan
added: 7 8 "Raising as it does the possibility that a good faith critic of
government will be penalized for his criticism, the proposition
relied on by the Alabama courts strikes at the very center of the
constitutionally protected area of free expression."
When these three passages are taken together, it becomes evident
that the Court was not simply uttering, as the Court is wont to do,
the occasional sentence that reads felicitously even out of context.
It was clearly being driven by a concern for the central meaning of
the First Amendment.
"77

VI. TRurH, FALSITY, AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH
The Court's confrontation of the relevance of truth to a
constitutional doctrine of free speech, closely related as it is to the
idea of seditious libel, requires further consideration. Here again
Mr. Justice Brennan's observations are refreshing because they far
transcend in importance the resolution of the specific issue before
the Court.
The question may be asked: Does the constitutional protection
of freedom of speech simply establish the right to utter the truth?
70
History makes clear that this would be no inconsiderable freedom.
Certainly there are various interesting limitations in contemporary
law on the immunity of truth tellers.80 The critical question, however, is whether falsity must not also be protected. The classic de77 376 U.S. at 292.

78 Ibid.

70 It must be acknowledged that a good part of the historic controversy over
seditious libel centered on the defense of truth. See note 54 supra.
80
Franklin, A Constitutional Problem in Privacy Protection: Legal Inhibitions
on Reporting of Fact, 16 STAN. L. lbv. 107 (1963); The Origins and Constitutionality of Limitations on Truth as a Defense in Tort Law, id. at 789 (1964).

HeinOnline -- 1964 Sup. Ct. Rev. 210 1964

THE NEW YORK TIMES CASE

211

fenses of freedom of speech have all suggested that the truth should
not be used to discriminate between permissible and impermissible
speech, at least at the level of ideas. More recently the point has
been effectively put by Alexander Meildejohn: 8 1 "The vital point
...is that no suggestion of policy shall be denied a hearing because
it is on one side of the issue rather than another.... These conflicting views may be expressed, must be expressed, not because they are
valid, but because they are relevant."
For at least a generation it has been the prevailing notion that at
the level of doctrine and ideas the Constitution did not distinguish
between the true and the false. 82 A short time ago, the proposition
was admirably summed up by Mr. Justice Stewart in the Kingsley
Pictures case which was concerned with a state ban on the movie

based on Lady Chatterley'sLover:8
It is contended that the State's action was justified because
the motion picture attractively portrays a relationship which
is contrary to the moral standards, the religious precepts, and
the legal code of its citizenry. This argument misconceives
what it is that the Constitution protects. Its guarantee is not
confined to the expression of ideas that are conventional or
shared by a majority. It protects advocacy of the opinion that
adultery may sometimes be proper, no less than advocacy of
socialism or the single tax. And in the realm of ideas it protects
expression which is eloquent no less than that which is unconvincing.
What has been less clear was the vulnerability to legal discipline
of false statements of fact. And it was to this issue that Mr. Justice
Brennan spoke with such force in the opinion in the Times case.
False statements of fact, at least on public issues, are apparently to
be afforded constitutional protection. Two different rationales were
tendered in support of this proposition. There was stress on the
likelihood that errors of fact will be made. The Court, thus, approvingly quoted from Cantwell's behavioral dictum: s "To persuade
81 MEILEJOHN,PoLTIcAL FREEDOM 26-28 (1948).

s2 Indeed it was a principal puzzle of the Scopes case, for example, that the situ-

ation seemed to require the court to make a choice between truth and falsity. See
Kalven, Emerson, Haber, & Sharp, The Scopes Case: A 1960 View, 27 U. Cm. L.
REv. 505 (1960).
83 Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1959).
8
4 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940), quoted 376 U.S. at 271.
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others of his own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at times
resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been or are
prominent in church or state, and even to false statement." The
Court went on to state:8 5 "... erroneous statement is inevitable in
free debate, and ... must be protected if the freedoms of expression
are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need ... to survive.'"
Once again we are reminded that the national commitment is to
debate on public issues that is "uninhibited, robust, and wide open."
The Court is also moved, however, by the difficulty of proving
truth in these matters, and of putting the speaker to the risk of
proof before fallible judges, juries, or administrative officials. In
dealing with this proposition, the Court, put together Smith v. California"6 and Speiser v. Randall8 7 to suggest a new category of invalid regulations: laws that tend to inhibit freedom of speech by
generating a kind of "self-censorship." Thus, the bookseller in
Smith, if left under so loose a requirement of scienter of obscenity,
would tend to restrict the books he sells to those he has inspected.
The law would then set off a chain reaction of self-censorship
"affecting the whole public, hardly less virulent for being privately
administered." ' s And the citizen seeking tax exemption in Speiser,
confronted with the loyalty test there involved which left the burden
of proof on the applicant, would become comparably reticent. "The
man who knows that he must bring forth proof and persuade
another of the lawfulness of his conduct necessarily must steer far
wider of the unlawful zone than if the State must bear these burdens." 89 So too in the Times case, the "critic of official conduct"
would be deterred from uttering what was in fact true "because of
doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of
having to do so." 9 Thus the special vice of such a law is that it
introduces a self-censorship that invades the zone of permissible and
85 376 U.S. at 271-72.

86 361 U.S. 147 (1949). See Kalven, Metapbysics of the Law of Obscenity, [1960]
SrPREm CouRT REvmw 1, 35 et seq.
87 357 U.S. 513 (1958). See Kalven & Steffen, The Bar Admission Cases: An
Unfinisbed Debate between justice Harlan and justice Black, 21 LAw IN TRANS. 155,
179 et seq. (1961).
88 361 U.S. at 153-54.

89 357 U.S. at 526.

90 376 U.S. at 279.
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lawful speech. From these three cases, all written by Mr. Justice
Brennan, emerges a fascinating and promising judicial utilization of
psychology.
It must be recognized, of course, that a reason implicit in the
breadth of the protection afforded speech is due to the judicial
recognition of its own incapacity to make nice discriminations. It
reflects a strategy that requires that speech be overprotected in
order to assure that it is not underprotected. In any event, the Times
opinion is as great a contribution to the issue of the relevance of
truth to protected speech as it is to the issue of the relevance of the
doctrine of seditious libel.
VII. "WmER ARE THEY Now?"
A not unfamiliar bit of Americana is a series of New Yorker
articles that ran some years ago under the rubric "Where are they
now?" The articles concerned with once familiar personages who
seemed to have disappeared from the scene."' In the world of constitutional ideas and formulas, it becomes pertinent, after the Times
case, to ask the same question about once familiar legal doctrines
totally ignored by the opinion. Where are they now?
A. THE CLEAR-AND-PRESENT DANGER TEST

It has become a commonplace for commentators on constitutional law to note that the clear-and-present danger test is not flourishing these days. Thus, so careful a student as Professor Thomas I.
Emerson recently concluded that the test may have been abandoned by the majority of the Court.92 Whether the rewriting of it
by Judge Learned Hand in the Dennis case 9 3 or the persistent attack
on it as a constitutional formula by Mr. Justice Frankfurter94 or the
perplexities of the newer speech issues or the sheer inadequacy of
the formula itself caused its decline may be unclear. But it is clear
91 The leading right-to-privacy case arose out of one of the articles in this series.
See Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940). Newsweek now runs
a weeldy feature under the same tide.
92
Emerson, supra note 56, at 912.
03 United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950).
94

See, e.g., his concurring opinion in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 517
(1951).
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that, as of the judgment in the Times case, it has disappeared. It did
not occur to the Court to test the Alabama law before it in terms of
clear and present danger, 95 although barely a decade before, in
Beauharnais, appeal to that test was the principal argument of the
defendant.9 6 (It was one of the astute and successful gambles of the
Wechsler brief that it did not argue the case in terms of clear and
present danger.) The measure of the conceptual revolution promulgated by the Times case is that the Alabama law is found unconstitutional, not because there is no clear and present danger of a substantive evil in defendants' speech, but because the law looks too
much like punishment for seditious libel.
There was one mention of the clear-and-present danger test in
the majority opinion. It occurred in a reference to Pennekamp v.
Florida97 when the Court analogized the problem of defamation
with that of contempt of court by publication. It would seem that
the contempt problem is at least a sibling if not a twin to the one
presented in the Times case. The former involves defamation of a
specific public official, a judge. It might have been expected,
therefore, that the same solution would fit both problems. But the
modem Supreme Court decisions on the contempt problemBridges,98 Craig,99 and Pennekamp-all rely for their disposition on
the clear-and-present danger test. And as recently as 1962, in Wood
v. Georgia,100 the Court adhered to this approach in disposing of a
contempt case. The contempt cases make the Court's silence in the
Times case on the viability of the clear-and-present danger test all
the more deafening.
B. BALANCING

Immediately prior to the Times decision, the fashionable First
Amendment test was what Professor Emerson called "ad hoc bal95

It is certainly not easy to apply the test to a defamation case. A try at it was
made, but with what success? See Kalven, supra note 4, at 12-13.
96 The expectation that the Court would have to confront the clear-and-present
danger test in an obscenity case survived until 1957. See Kalven, note 86 supra.
97328

U.S. 331 (1946).

98 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
99 Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
100 370 U,S, 375 (1962).

HeinOnline -- 1964 Sup. Ct. Rev. 214 1964

THE NEW YORK TIMES CASE

215

ancing." This formula, which he dates from the Douds'01 case in
1950, has been the subject of several celebrated debates within the
Court, especially between Justices Black and Harlan. The controversy has centered on large issues about absolutes and the proper
role of judicial review. 10 2 Professor Emerson, a critic of the balancing formula, has defined it: 103 "The formula is that the court must,
in each case, balance the individual and social interest in freedom of
expression against the social interest sought by the regulation which
restricts expression."
It is scarcely a novel suggestion that the law of defamation with
its strict liability on the one hand and its complex of offsetting
privileges on the other is a prime example of balancing the interest
in freedom against the social interest sought by inhibiting communication. 10 4 It is this balancing that in fact generates the bulk of
the law in this area and the special fascination that it has derives
from the precision and detail with which the common law has
struck the balance in different situations. The issue before the Court
in the Times case, therefore, would have been peculiarly meet for
the application of the balancing formula. Again the failure to speak
to the issue, either in the Court's opinion or Mr. Justice Black's concurrence, suggests the necessity for its re-evaluation.
The point, however, is even stronger. In substance, the Court
adopted as its constitutional principle the so-called minority view of
Coleman v. MacLennan,105 an old Kansas case that Mr. Justice
Brennan quoted with approval. Coleman contains a stunning, extensive opinion by Justice Burch of the Kansas Supreme Court. The
Burch opinion may well be the most elaborate, careful, extended act
of balancing in the history of American law. It is one long, able
dialogue on the problem. If ever a case was appropriate for the
101 American

Communications Association, C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).

102See Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 865 (1960); Meiklejohn,
The First Amendment Is an Absolute, [1961] SuMRwm CoURT REvmw 245; The

Balancing of Self-Preservationagainst PoliticalFreedom, 49 CALm'. L. REv. 4 (1961);
Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L. J. 1424 (1962).
103 Emerson, supra note 56, at 912.
104 Any good torts casebook makes this apparent. See, e.g., GREORY & KALvEx

996-1064.
105 78 Kan. 711 (1908).
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application of the balancing test, the Times case was. But, from the
Court, only silence.
The silence here, however, does not suggest the same result as the
silence accorded the clear-and-present danger test. It means only
that the balancing cases have been treated as having too wide an
application. The philosophic debate over balancing has overshot the
actual area of controversy. Whatever the Court may have said, it
has never used the balancing formula except in a limited type of
speech case, 106 a category in which the Times case did not fall.
A distinction must be drawn between cases in which legal sanctions are imposed for the specific purpose of restricting speech and
those in which the control of speech is a by-product of government
action that is otherwise permissible. Douds,1 7 Bates,08 and Konigsberg,10 9 for example, did not involve the direct application of a
sanction intended to deter speech. It is in these cases that the Court
has sought to solve the problems before it by some effort to balance
the state's acknowledged interest against the resulting interference
with speech. It seems to me that in this regard Mr. Justice Harlan
has been clearer than Mr. Justice Black as to the precise scope of the
issue. Mr. Justice Harlan would not balance in the ordinary case,
but only in these curiously oblique speech cases where he sees no
way to avoid it.11° Mr. Justice Black, on the other hand, often
appears to treat the issue as if it involved a reappraisal of all First
Amendment cases. And he insists that if there is any governmentally
initiated interference with speech, however unintended and however slight, the action is unconstitutional.
I do not mean here to pass judgment on which of the Justices has
the better of the argument, but only to stress that the speech issue
involved in the Times case is different in kind from those in which
the Court has utilized its balancing formula. The intended function
of the tort law was to discipline certain kinds of speech. The importance of the silence of the Times case on the balancing test is that it
cuts it down to its appropriate size.
106 See Kalven & Steffen, supra note 87.
107 Note 101 supra.

Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
109 Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
10 Id. at 51.
'os
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There is, of course, a sense in which the Court did indulge in balancing. It did not go the whole way and give an absolute privilege
to the "citizen-critic." It left open the possibility of liability where
the defendant's actions were the result of actual malice. Like Justice
Burch, therefore, it has balanced the two obvious conflicting interests. Nonetheless, the idiom of balancing was eschewed in the Times
case not only by the majority but by the concurring opinions as
well.
C. THE TWO-LEVEL THEORY 111

Beginning with Chaplinsky," 2 in 1942, and emerging as the central point of Beauharnais18 in 1952 and Roth114 in 1957, the Court
developed a special technique for fitting certain kinds of freespeech problems into the constitutional framework. The technique
consisted of dividing speech into two categories: that which is
worthy enough to require the application of First Amendment protection and that which is beneath First Amendment concerns. The
litany of lower-level speech, so often quoted from Chaplinsky, runs
as follows:" 5 "There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited
classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These inlude the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or fighting words." This passage had served the Court well
in disposing of the problem of group libel in Beauharnaisand of
obscenity in Roth. It is not quoted in the Times case.
In this instance, however, the point is not passed over~in silence.
The plaintiffs had urged as a principal argument in defense of the
judgment that libel was not constitutionally protected. The Court
confronted the issue directly and disposed of it firmly:116 ".... 'mere
labels' of state law" cannot control constitutional judgment; "libel
can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It
must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment."
No matter how speech is classified, there must still be First Amendment consideration and review. No category of speech is any
"1 This awkward phrase is my own. See Kalven, note 86 supra.
112 Note 32 supra.

Note 35 supra.
114 Note 36 supra.
"3

115 315 U.S. at 571-72.
116 367 US. at 269.
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longer beneath the protection of the First Amendment. Had the
Times case preceded Roth, for example, Roth could not have been
written the way it was, although the decision might have been the
same. Obscenity, too, it would seem, "can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations."
The special logic of Chaplinsky, Beauharnais,and Roth may well
disappear now that the Times opinion is on the books. The twolevel theory may, in any event, have been the consequence of an
attempt to avoid the clear-and-present danger test. Now that that
test has been obliterated, there may no longer be a need for the
special technique developed to deal with it.
D. THE TWO-TIER THEORY OF THE FIRST AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS

The final pocket of Supreme Court ideology affected by the
Times case is a special view of federalism. The view was expressed
primarily by Mr. Justice Jackson in Beauharnaisand by Mr. Justice
Harlan in Roth. It has never received the sanction of a majority of
the Court.117 The point of the argument is that the First Amendment as applied to the federal government has a different and more
stringent meaning than the Fourteenth Amendment when it incorporates the standards of the First in application to the states.
In the Times case, the Court upset a common-law rule followed
in the great majority of the states. The situation seemed ripe for the
utilization of the two-tier suggestion. The states might wen have
been given some leeway in experimenting with what Coleman v.
MacLennan"18 treated as a close policy question. Once again the
arresting fact is that Mr. Justice Harlan let his pet theory go by
default. Apparently we need a single national policy on the privilege of fair comment. We are, after all, talking about seditious libel
and the core of the First Amendment.
In one brief passage, Mr. Justice Brennan spoke directly to the
two-tier thesis and rejected it. The plaintiffs had apparently argued
117 See Kalven, supra note 86, at 21-23. A thoughtful theoretical argument for
federalism in the free speech area has recently been put forward. See Anastaplo,
Notes on the First Amendment (unpublished PhD. thesis University of Chicago
1964).

118 Note 105 supra.
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that "the constitutional limitations implicit in the history of the
Sedition Act apply only to Congress and not to the States." 119 It did
not unnerve the Court that this seemed to have been the view of
Thomas Jefferson. 120 The thesis was that the furor over the Sedition
Act was the expression of a view about federalism rather than about
freedom of speech. The Court, in a grand but illogical gesture,
disposed of the challenge summarily:' 2 1 ". . . this distinction was
eliminated with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and
the application to the States of the First Amendment's restrictions."
The argument presumably is that limitations on federal power that
have their origin in a deference to state power become by the alchemy of the Fourteenth Amendment limitations on state power.
VIII. THE CoNC uRRING OprmoNs
In separate concurring opinions, in each of which Mr. Justice
Douglas joined, Justices Black and Goldberg argued essentially the
same objection, 2 that the majority did not go far enough to provide adequate protection to critics of official conduct. The minority would make an absolute privilege where the majority created
only a qualified one that was defeasible on proof of actual malice.
It is possible to speculate on the reasons why the Court stopped
short of absolute privilege. The more important question, however,
is whether the failure to go all the way impeached the majority's
major premise. Has it spoiled the sweep of its powerful new reading
of the First Amendment?
Certainly if the "citizen-critic" is now to be viewed as a public
official and if strength is to be borrowed from the analogy of the

privilege given public officials by Barr v. Matteo, it is difficult to see
why the citizen is given a lesser privilege than the official. Perhaps a
distinction might be based on the difference in numbers between
officials and citizens. Arguably the official is a more vulnerable tar"19

376 U.S. at 276.

120 See LEvy, JEFFERSON Aim Cwvm LrBE-S: THE DARKE

SmF

(1963).

121376 U.S. at 277.
22

The one difference between the opinions would seem to be that Mr. Justice
Goldberg would retain an area of private life in which a public official would
have the benefits of the ordinary rules of defamation. He is not dismayed by the
difficulty of drawing this distinction. 376 U.S. at 302 n.4.
'
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get for harassment, because there are so few of him and so many of
the public. Equally troublesome may be the Court's premise about
"self-censorship." If the citizen cannot be put to the hazards of
proving truth without deterring him from risking certain useful
criticism, is not the same censorship generated by a rule that leaves
on him the risk of proof of malice? Here the answer would seem to
be that the risks are different because the burden of proving both
falsity and malice are now on the plaintiff.
If the majority opinion does seem to have the worst of the debate
on these two points, there remain three important countervailing
considerations in support of its view. First, the Court's concern has
been with the kind of inevitable factual error and exaggeration that
are not extraordinary accompaniments of robust criticism. It is willing to forgive this kind of error. Its affirmative policy need not extend to deliberate falsehoods. Second, the Court was showing considerable daring in upsetting so long-standing a rule of common law
that prevailed in so large a majority of the states. To hold in favor
of absolute privilege would upset the common-law rule in all the
states. Finally, it should be remembered that the Court was not dealing simply with Negro defamation of southern public officials. It
was dealing with a general rule for limitation of criticism of public
officials. The Court makes actual malice a "constitutional fact" that
it will review de novo and indeed did review de novo in the case
itself. There is thus some protection afforded against a too facile or
disingenuous finding of the existence of malice.
I would conclude that the majority opinion survives the concurring opinions in good shape. There can be something demeaning in
carping too much about the illiberality of so distinctively liberal an
opinion.

123

IX. CONCLUSION

We get a sense of difference between a legal theory of freedom of speech and a philosophic theory as we trace the career of
12

3 Mr. Justice Goldberg does try for a neat debater's point about the constitutionality of the Sedition Act under the standard of the Court's opinion. The Sedition
Act, too, provided for prosecutions for malicious statements. But the point was long
ago disposed of by establishing the difference in meaning between "actual malice"
as used in the Court's opinion and constructive malice that would satisfy the Sedition
Act. See Bromage v. Prosser, 4 B. & C. 247 (1825); Smith, Jones 'v. Hulton: Three
Conflicting Judicial Views as to a Question of Defamation, 60 U. PA. L. REv. 365
(1912).
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seditious libel from seventeenth-century England through Fox's
Libel Act through the Sedition Act to the Times case. It is one
thing to assert that a vigorous criticism of the government must be
permitted. It is another to choose among the calibrations of freedom
that legal institutions and procedures can provide. Initially the great
issue about seditious libel was whether judge or jury would have
the final say as to what was defamatory of the government. The
effect of Fox's Libel Act was simply to shift control from the
judges to the juries, from the government and its judges to the
people themselves. Then it became important to establish truth as a
defense. 124 And, finally, in the Times case the critical area involves
the degree of privilege to be afforded statements that are not true.
We are reminded not only of how much more complex the legal
debate over freedom of speech or over seditious libel can be, but
again of the arresting problem how much freedom of speech in a
legal system must depend on law's conscious distrust of its own
processes to make needed discriminations.
The closing question, of course, is whether the treatment of seditious libel as the key concept for development of appropriate constitutional doctrine will prove germinal. It is not easy to predict
what the Court will see in the Times opinion as the years roll by. It
may regard the opinion as covering simply one pocket of cases,
those dealing with libel of public officials, and not destructive of the
earlier notions that are inconsistent only with the larger reading of
the Court's action. But the invitation to follow a dialectic progression from public official to government policy to public policy to
matters in the public domain, like art, seems to me to be overwhelming. If the Court accepts the invitation, it will slowly work out for
itself the theory of free speech that Alexander Meildejohn has been
1 25
offering us for some fifteen years now.
24

It is an instructive quirk of history that the Sedition Act of 1798 has come
down to us as odious legislation while Fox's Libel Act of 1792 is seen as a milestone
on the march to liberty. Yet the Sedition Act followed Fox's Libel Act in providing
jury trial and went further by affording the defendant the defense of truth. The
fact that this liberalizing of the law of seditious libel was viewed so dimly in the
United States suggests, to my mind, some doubts about the validity of Dean Levy's
thesis as to the common understanding prior to the Sedition Act crisis.
125 It is perhaps a fitting postscript to say that I had occasion this summer to discuss the Times case with Mr. Meiklejohn. Before I had disclosed my own views, I
asked him for his judgment of the Times case. "It is," he said, "an occasion for
dancing in the streets." As always, I am inclined to think he is right.
1
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